Florida Journal of International Law
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 6

September 1990

The New Zealand Bill of Rights: A Step Towards the Canadian and
American Examples or a Continuation of Parlimentary
Supremacy?
Michael Principe

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil

Recommended Citation
Principe, Michael (1990) "The New Zealand Bill of Rights: A Step Towards the Canadian and American
Examples or a Continuation of Parlimentary Supremacy?," Florida Journal of International Law: Vol. 6: Iss.
1, Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol6/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Principe: The New Zealand Bill of Rights: A Step Towards the Canadian and A

The New Zealand Bill of Rights: A Step Towards the
Canadian and American Examples or a Continuation of
Parliamentary Supremacy?
Michael Principe*
The recently adopted New Zealand Bill of Rights' presents to that
nation's judiciary a variety of options whereby it can elect to either
move a little closer to the Canadian and American practices of judicial
review or continue to maintain its practice of upholding the principle
of parliamentary supremacy. The focus of this article is to examine
some of these options and then reflect upon them in light of the
experiences of the Canadian and American judiciaries.
In 1985, New Zealand's Labour Government introduced a White
Paper to Parliament supporting a Bill of Rights. 2 Within this document,
the government outlined its intentions to adopt a Bill of Rights that
would 1) be the supreme law of the land,3 2) recognize the rights of
the Maori under the Treaty of Waitangi, 4 3) insure the right to freedom
from discrimination, 5 and 4) establish in the courts the power of judicial
review.6 During the subsequent five years, debates flourished over
the Bill of Rights. Issues discussed in the debates included 1) whether
the Bill of Rights would bestow too much power in an undemocratic
institution, the judiciary (eventually making it the most powerful
branch of government), and 2) conversely, whether
legislative oppres7
sion can be prevented without a Bill of Rights?

* J.D., 1983, J niversity of Washington; M.A., 1988, University of California, Santa Barbara;
C. Phil., 1990, currently an American Fulbright Scholar at the Victoria University School of
Law, Wellington, New Zealand.
1. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 109 (assented to Aug. 28, 1990) [hereinafter
The Act].

2.

HON. GEOFFREY PALMER,

A

BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NEW ZEALAND:

A

WHITE PAPER

A6 (1985).
3. Id. at 68.
4. Id. at 74-75.
5. Id. at 85.
6. Id. at 109-16.
7. NADJA TOLLEMACHE, THE PROPOSED BILL OF RIGHTS: A DISCUSSION AND RESOURCE PAPER (Mar. 1986)(with assistance from Pam Ringwood).
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These debates continued until August 1990 when, with the October
elections closing in, Parliament passed a Bill of Rights Act, but one
that is much more limited than the proposed White Paper. Rather
than become the supreme law of the land, this Act is merely on the
same level as any other legislative enactment of Parliament, and it
specifically prohibits the judiciary from striking down laws of Parliament, whether passed before or after the commencement of this Act.8
Responses to the Act in the local newspapers were immediate and
generally negative. Some claimed the Bill of Rights was "empty window-dressing," while others maintained that it was "disastrous. "10
Yet, these responses may have been a bit premature. For, although
the courts are prohibited from striking down an enactment in violation
of the Bill of Rights, there are possibilities for a judiciary interested
in controlling the interpretation of an enactment. For instance, unlike
the American Constitution, the New Zealand Act specifically mentions
the power to implement good faith affirmative action measures, 1' the
right to the observance of the principles of natural justice,12 as well
as the notion of judicial review. 13 When these sections are combined
with Provision 6 of the Act, specifying that the preferred interpreta14
tion of any enactment is one consistent with this Bill of Rights, it
would appear that the New Zealand judiciary has now been provided
with an opportunity to examine the interpretations of a variety of laws.
Perhaps no where will this opportunity be greater than within the
parameters of Provision 27(2) of the Act, which provides that: "Every
person whose rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognized
by law have been affected by a determination of any tribunal or other
public authority has the right to apply, in accordance with law, for
judicial review of that determination.' '1 5 It is under this provision that
a court, in examining the actions of a public authority, could decide
that the public authority ignored the clearly expressed intentions of
Parliament to interpret enactments as being as consistent as possible
with the Bill of Rights. The court could maintain that, as Parliament
has expressly stated a desire to have issues of natural justice, human
rights, freedom from discrimination, and fundamental freedoms af-

8. The Act, supra note 1, at 2.
9. Window Dressing, THE DOMINION, Aug. 28, 1990, at 8.
10. Disastrous,Says Aids Foundation, THE EVENING POST, Aug. 24, 1990, at 6.
11. The Act, supra note 1, at 4.
12. Id. at 6-7.
13. Id. at 7.
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id. at 7.
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firmed, protected, and promoted in New Zealand, 16 public authorities,
as well as tribunals, must consider these rights and freedoms in interpreting enactments. Thus, although the court will have no power to
strike down an enactment in violation of the Bill of Rights, it could
have a great deal of influence upon how certain acts of Parliament
are administered.
Therefore, the Bill of Rights has at least opened the door to such
judicial action. Yet, as the Canadian and American experiences have
shown, whether the New Zealand courts will choose to take advantage
of this opportunity depends upon the judges themselves. An examination of these North American experiences will help to illuminate the
situation.
The Canadian Bill of Rights Act came into effect in 1960, forcing
the judiciary to consider whether to take a more activist role in disputes involving the government or to maintain their non-interventionist role within the legislative realm. With few exceptions, the
Supreme Court of Canada chose to adhere to the principle of parliamentary supremacy. One of the earliest cases involving the Bill of Rights
was Robertson & Rosetanni v. The Queen.17 In that case, Justice
Ritchie, speaking generally about the Bill of Rights, set the tone for
the Court's eventual view of the enactment as a whole. He stated
that: "The Canadian Bill of Rights is not concerned with 'human rights
and fundamental freedoms' in the abstract sense but rather with such
'rights and freedoms' as they existed in Canada immediately before
the Statute was enacted."18 This view drastically limited any development in the area of human rights and civil liberties protections. Instead, the Court continued its role as an umpire of disputes, carefully
avoiding what it considered to be the domain of the legislative body
in government. As stated by the Canadian constitutional scholar, Professor Elman: "This, so-called 'frozen rights' theory of interpretation
clearly limited the potential development of the Canadian Bill of
Rights."' 9 Thus, it wasn't until April of 1982, when the Canadian
Constitution came into power, 20 that the judiciary changed its views
towards judicial activism.
The Canadian Constitution became the supreme law of the land
and authorized the judiciary to invalidate any laws inconsistent with

16. Id. at 1.
17. [1963] S.C.R. 651.
18. Id. at 654.
19. Bruce P. Elnan, Altering the Judicial Mind and the Process of Constitution Making
in Canada, 28 ALTA. L. REV. 521, 524 (1990).
20. Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
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this enactment. In addition, Part 1 of the Constitution, the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, guaranteed the nation's citizens
legal, political, linguistic, and equality rights. As a result, the Constitution overtook Parliament in superiority and the Supreme Court became
the guardian of the Constitution, zealously protecting and developing
individual rights and freedoms2 against legislative intrusion.
Yet, it is the zeal with which the Supreme Court has chosen to
protect and define individual rights that has been pointed to as at
least partially resulting from the composition of personalities upon the
Court. It has been argued that, had a number of the retiring conservative justices in the 1980s been replaced by other conservatives,
rather than by the liberals who did replace them, the Court could
have proceeded at a slower pace and, thus, avoided such a monumental
break from Canada's constitutional past.This same notion of judicial independence is also found in the American experience. The framers of the United States Constitution vigorously debated over the issue of judicial review. Some, such as Alexander Hamilton, maintained that judicial review was essential to prevent
legislative oppression. In The Federalist No. 78, Hamilton argued:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar
province of the courts ....
Nor does this conclusion by any
means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative
power. It only supposes that the power of the people is
superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature,
declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the
people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be
governed by the latter rather than the former. 23
Others argued that the judiciary would become uncontrollable with
judicial review powers, that it could eventually mold the government
into any shape it pleases by declaring void all laws it feels are inconsistent with its interpretation of the Constitution. 24 As a result of
these debates, the framers chose not to mention judicial review in the
Constitution whatsoever. Thus, the judiciary was neither provided
with such powers nor prohibited from assuming them.
This argument remained unsettled until Chief Justice John Marshall's decision in Marbury v. Madison,2 which stated that the Su21.
22.
23.

Southam, Inc. v. Combines Investigation Branch, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 155-56.
Elman, supra note 19, at 526-30.
ALPHEUS MASON & GORDON E. BAKER, FREE GOVERNMENT IN THE MAKING: READ-

INGS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

24.
25.

251-52 (Oxford Univ. Press 1985).

Id. at 246-50.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol6/iss1/6

4

Principe: The New Zealand
Bill of Rights:
Step
Towards the Canadian and A
NEW ZEALAND
BILL AOF
RIGHTS

preme Court is competent to declare Congressional legislation unconstitutional. What is interesting about this case is that Marshall arrived
at this decision even though: 1) the Constitution does not provide for
such powers in the judiciary; 2) President Thomas Jefferson and the
majority of the executive and legislative branches were clearly opposed
to judicial review; and 3) Marshall did not know if the decision would
be respected or totally ignored. Thus, it is possible that without Marbury v. Madison judicial review would not exist in the United States
today. As stated by the eminent American constitutional scholar and
former Chairman of the University of Chicago Political Science Department, C. Herman Pritchett:
The extent to which the framers and ratifiers of the American
Constitution meant to confer on the judiciary authority to
assess the validity of congressional and presidential interpretations of the Constitution is something about which we can
never be fully certain .... But whatever scope and authority
the framers meant to give judges, the plain fact is that since
(Marbury), the United States has managed to live with a
broad measure of judicial authority
to invalidate acts of coor26
dinate branches of government.
Since the times of Justice Marshall, the debates have generally
shifted from whether the court has judicial review powers to how
much of an activist the court can become. These debates become
especially intense whenever there is a vacancy upon the Supreme
Court. Both activist and restraint proponents claim that by filling the
Court with a jurist supported by the other group, the country will fall
into ruin. Cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut,27 where the Supreme
Court declared the Constitution provides for a right of privacy even
though it is not specifically mentioned in the document, have been at
the center of the activist/restraint argument. Proponents of judicial
activism generally argue that the Court cannot prevent legislative oppression of fundamental values unless it has the ability to make significant changes in public policy; while judicial restraint supporters maintain that, as the court is an undemocratic institution, lacking the
resources to effectively ascertain public policy choices, it should avoid
judicial law-making.- Therefore, like the Canadian system, it would
appear what is important in the American system is the personality/ju-

26.

WALTER

F.

MURPHY & C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS:

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 480 (Random House 1986).

27.
28.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court, CONG. Q., 1985, at 5.
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dicial theory of the Supreme Court Justice, and not simply the position
of Supreme Court Justice in and of itself.
In conclusion, when examining the opportunities now available to
the New Zealand judiciary by way of the recently adopted New Zealand Bill of Rights, it is worth considering the experiences of the
Canadian and American judiciaries. Although, unlike the American
Constitution, the New Zealand courts are expressly prohibited from
invalidating laws inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act, the Act
does specify that the preferred interpretation of any enactment is one
consistent with this Bill of Rights. In addition, the Act expressly
specifies the concepts of judicial review, natural justice, human rights,
and fundamental freedoms, concepts not expressly included in the
American Constitution. Thus, controlling the interpretation of an
enactment would seem to be a logical avenue for the courts.
Hopefully, unlike the Canadian judiciary with its Bill of Rights,
the New Zealand judiciary will not pass up this opportunity to help
protect human rights and civil liberties by examining the actions of
public authorities and tribunals in connection with their interpretations
of New Zealand laws. Of course, as with the Canadian and American
examples, the make-up of the New Zealand judiciary will be vital to
any change in jurisprudential focus away from an absolute application
of the principle of parliamentary/legislative supremacy.
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